On trying to say what “goes without saying”. Wittgenstein on certainty and ineffability

This paper offers a philosophical outlook on the subject of the communication ofcertainty and uncertainty, by focusing on the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s image of“hinges”. Hinges are basic common sense certainties which ordinarily “go withoutsaying”. In a sense, they even require not to be said. Lingering over the debate onthe ineffability of hinges which is at the core of the Wittgensteinian secondary literature,but also hinting at some studies in psychopathology, the paper argues thatin extraordinary contexts to assert explicitly a hinge-certainty is possible and maybe important, while in ordinary contexts certainty can only be communicatedthrough silence: when a certainty which “goes without saying” is explicitly said, thesituation paradoxically results in uncertainty.This paper offers a philosophical outlook on the subject of the communication ofcertainty and uncertainty, by focusing on the later Ludwig Wittgenstein’s image of“hinges”. Hinges are basic common sense certainties which ordinarily “go withoutsaying”. In a sense, they even require not to be said. Lingering over the debate onthe ineffability of hinges which is at the core of the Wittgensteinian secondary literature,but also hinting at some studies in psychopathology, the paper argues thatin extraordinary contexts to assert explicitly a hinge-certainty is possible and maybe important, while in ordinary contexts certainty can only be communicatedthrough silence: when a certainty which “goes without saying” is explicitly said, thesituation paradoxically results in uncertainty